Previous studies of discrimination have explored the role that customer prejudice may play in lowering the marginal revenue product of minority employees and, hence, lowering their equilibrium wages. I observe that variation in these types of customer preferences creates an incentive for firms to respond strategically by engaging in product differentiation via the characteristics of their employees. Analysis of data collected for local television news stations supports the predictions of this model of "competitive discrimination." There is a negative correlation between the racial, gender, and age compositions of competing news stations. Moreover, Nielsen ratings for station broadcasts indicate that viewers of stations with more black employees are less discriminatory than viewers of stations with fewer blacks. A similar result is found when examining the age and gender composition of employees.
Introduction
Discrimination is often treated as the direct result of prejudice against minority groups. For instance, in the classic Becker (1957) model of customer discrimination, customer animus towards blacks lowers their marginal product of labor and, hence, equilibrium wage level. What has not previously been considered is that variation in customer prejudice creates an incentive for firms to respond strategically by adjusting the racial make-up of their employees to gain monopoly power over segments of consumers who share similar tastes for race or other characteristics. In this case, rather than confounding the empirical identification of discrimination as in Ross (2003) and Myers (2004) , product differentiation is itself a form of "competitive discrimination."
This paper presents an illustrative model in which firms respond to customer preferences by differentiating via the characteristics of their employees. Evidence is provided by data describing local television news stations in the 25 largest U.S. markets and Nielsen ratings for their broadcasts. In these data, employee characteristics are readily visible, ratings provide a measure of customer response, and the presence of competing stations in each market allows for the possibility of strategic response among firms.
The results support the model of competitive discrimination. There is a negative correlation between the demographic make-up of employees at competing stations, and the ratings data suggest that the stations with relatively few visible black employees are catering to the more discriminatory customers. While a similar result is found for age and gender, the reverse holds for Hispanics and Asians. This may reflect a taste for diversity, or it be the result of omitted ratings information for foreign-language broadcasts.
Literature Review
Previous analyses of the role of customer preferences in generating discriminatory outcomes have tended to focus on professional sports, where worker output and customer demand are readily observable.
1 The evidence from these studies has varied considerably with the particular sport, time period, and type of position examined. Studies of baseball prior to the 1980s did not find evidence of customer discrimination (Gwartney and Haworth, 1974; Sommers and Quinton, 1982) ; studies of baseball and basketball since the 1980s have found evidence of a negative customer response to minorities (Kahn and Sherer, 1988; Nardinelli and Simon, 1990; Burdekin and Idson, 1991; Kanazawa and Funk, 2001) ; and a recent study of football quarterbacks finds evidence of customer tastes for diversity (Aldrich et al., 2005) . These disparities in the empirical literature suggest that the degree and magnitude of customer discrimination may be affected by the visibility of employees and the racial composition of customers and/or employees.
While they have provided a great deal of empirical evidence, sports markets may have more than their share of idiosyncracies. Consumers of sports are predominantly male and may not be representative of consumers in general. ESPN, for instance, reports that while 45 percent of TV viewers are male, 77 percent of its viewers are (2004) . In contrast, a Pew Research Center survey found that 61 percent of female respondents and 56 percent of male respondents report regularly watching local television news, suggesting a more balanced audience (2004) .
In addition, most sports teams have local monopolies, which precludes analysis of how competing firms respond to customer preferences. Local television news stations have direct competition in the same market that allows for the possibility of strategic interaction among firms. Waldfogel (2004) looks at the relationship between market demographics and traditional product differentiation via the types of programming offered by local television. He finds that increasing concentration of similar individuals in a market is associated with greater targeting of local media offerings for that group in terms of providing programming that minority groups are more likely to watch. In this paper, rather than engaging in traditional product differentiation in response to customer characteristics as in Waldfogel (2003 Waldfogel ( , 2004 Waldfogel ( , 2006 , firms differentiate via the characteristics of employees in response to customer prejudice.
A Model of Competitive Discrimination

Basic Model
Becker's (1957) well-known model of customer discrimination assumes that customers will interact with one employee when they purchase the output of a firm and that they act as though the price is marked up if that employee is black. He shows that, in equilibrium, firms will pay a lower wage to black employees and charge a lower nominal price for their output than for that of white employees. There is no implication for overall firm composition. In equilibrium, employers are indifferent between black and white employees; black employees have a lower marginal revenue product, but also have a lower marginal cost.
However, the assumptions that support this prediction are not always realistic. In many markets, local news being one, customers cannot interact with only a black or only a white employee. Rather, a customer will come into contact with many of a firm's employees. Incorporating this possibility into Becker's theoretical model, and using some of the tools of models of product differentiation, I show that firms may, in fact, have a preference for the racial composition of their workforces.
Suppose that there are two possible groups from which a firm can hire employees: minorities and non-minorities. Let m ∈ [0, 1] be the percentage of a firm's workforce that is composed of minorities. There are N consumers who each purchase one unit of output and have preferences over the racial composition of a firm so that consumer i behaves as if he paying P + d i m for that unit when he buys it for price P from a firm with racial composition m. The discrimination coefficient, d i , is distributed uniformly over [L, H] . Note in particular that if L < 0 some consumers have a preference for interacting with minorities.
2
Assume that there are two firms in this market and that each can choose the racial composition of its workforce and the price that it will charge for its output. This set-up is quite similar to that of a Hotelling-type model of product differentiation and will be solved as a two-stage game in which the firms first choose racial composition simultaneously and then, given the composition choices, choose prices. To solve for the Nash equilibrium, we work in reverse: we first see what the equilibrium prices are for fixed composition and then solve for the optimal composition given these prices.
Assume, then, that Firm 1 and Firm 2 have fixed racial compositions m 1 and m 2 , respectively, and, without loss of generality, that m 1 < m 2 . Then consumer i will buy from Firm 1 if
Relying on the uniform distribution of d i , we can derive the demand for output from each firm:
2 The key difference between the model presented here and a standard price/location competition model is that in the standard set-up, the distribution of customer tastes lies in the same space on which the firms locate. However, rather than assuming that each consumer has an ideal employee racial composition and that there is a uniform distribution of this ideal, consumers are either prejudiced (d i > 0) or not prejudiced (d i < 0) and that it is the intensity of this preference that varies. I find this specification to be more plausible as well as in keeping with previous work on discrimination. However, a similar prediction can also be found with a standard differentiation model with quadratic transportation costs. The prediction of differentiation in the model presented here is robust to alternative specifications of the consumer's price function. It is also robust to a model that is more specific to local television news in in which advertisers pay higher prices for shows that target more desirable demographic groups.
and
Each firm faces the same constant cost c per unit of output. Then Firm i chooses its price to maximize total profits given by
Maximizing this function for each firm and solving for the Nash equilibrium prices, we obtain
Moving to the choice of composition given the optimal prices, each firm will choose m to maximize the reduced-form profit function
Noting that when maximizing with respect to price each firm sets D i + (p i − c)∂D i /∂p i = 0 and using the envelope theorem,
Solving the two maximization problems,
In equilibrium, m * 1 = 0 and m * 2 = 1; that is, Firm 1 will always choose to have a workforce that is all non-minority while Firm 2 will be made up solely of minorities. The equilibrium price differential will depend on the distribution of tastes. If L > 0, then Firm 2, which is all minority, will charge a lower price than Firm 1, which is all white. However, if L and H are sufficiently low (H < −L) so that there is a relatively large number of consumers with preferences for minorities relative to those who are prejudiced against them, Firm 2 will charge a higher price than Firm 1.
This model of racial differentiation has implications for what we might see empirically. Firms will want to differentiate by racial composition in order to gain control of certain segments of the market. Firms with few minorities will cater to customers who are discriminatory against minorities while firms with more minorities cater to customer who are not discriminatory or who have a preference for minorities. The equilibrium relationship between racial composition and demand depends on the distribution of consumer preferences. In the case where H < −L, that is in which there are more consumers who prefer minorities than do not, firms with low minority composition will charge less and have lower demand than their rivals. But if H > −L, that is if more consumers are prejudiced against minorities than prefer them, then firms with low minority composition will cater to the most prejudiced consumers and will charge more and have greater demand than their competitors.
Incorporating Costs of Altering Racial Composition
One potential shortcoming of this theoretical model is that the prediction of maximal product differentiation seems extreme. Given the presence of equal employment opportunity (EEO) laws (as enforced by the Federal Communications Commission for local television stations) and racial differentials in labor supply, it may be quite expensive for firms to differentiate completely. To incorporate this possibility, suppose that Firm i incurs an additional cost of altering its racial composition from arbitrary level R which might be, for instance, the racial composition of the market as a whole. This cost could be the result of increasing the risk of lawsuits under EEO laws or of increasing search costs as a firm attempts to find minorities to fill all of its slots. Given quadratic costs of adjusting racial composition, Firm i's profit function is
This cost of altering racial composition does not affect the demand functions or firm i's best response price function, but does alter its location decision. Now the Nash equilibrium compositions are:
If there is a cost of adjusting composition, the firms will differentiate, but not necessarily completely. The equilibrium distance between them depends on the size of the population and the tastes of consumers. Note that
As the population size, N, grows, the degree of separation increases. However, the comparative statics for consumer preferences are not straightforward. The effect of changes in L and H on product differentiation depends on the size and sign of L and H.
Local Television News Data
The data used in this study are a combination of local ratings and market demographics furnished by Nielsen Media Research and station and broadcast data compiled from a variety of sources. The data can be broken down into three basic groups: ratings data, biographical data, and station data. Table A .1 in the appendix presents a summary of all variables used in the analysis.
Ratings Data
The ratings data are collected by Nielsen Media Research using electronic meters that measure whether a household is tuned in to a particular program minute-by-minute. Nielsen Media Research aggregates the data to calculate the average per-minute audience for a show which, in turn, is used to calculate a program's rating and share. The rating measures the ratio of the average number of households viewing a program to the number of households that have television sets (the potential audience). The share measures the ratio of the number of households viewing a program to the number of households viewing television at that time. The ratings data used in this paper were compiled by Nielsen Media Research for the 25 largest "Designated Market Areas" (DMAs) in the United States.
3 They measure the average audience over the month of November 2003 for the different daily local television news broadcasts on NBC, CBS, ABC, and FOX affiliates in each of the 25 DMAs. Nielsen Media Research did not make available the demographic composition of viewership, nor is it possible to obtain microdata in which the unit of observation is an individual viewer. Thus, the aggregate ratings data allow for estimation of the relationship between employee characteristics and customer preferences, but not for the additional step of mapping customer preferences to customer characteristics.
Ratings data are used for original newscasts between 5 a.m. and 12 a.m. local time. Table 1 reports average ratings and shares for local newscasts in the sample by time of day and part of week. News broadcasts that begin in the late evening are the most popular, with an average of 8 percent of T.V. households and 14 percent of households that are watching television watching a particular news program at this time. These averages are for one time of day and one station alone, and most cities have at least 4 stations broadcasting local news in English. Taken together, the ratings suggest that a large portion of the population watches local television news broadcasts, an observation corroborated by a Pew Research Center survey in which 59 percent of respondents reported "regularly" watching and an additional 23 percent reported "sometimes" watching local news (2004). anchor, weather anchor, and reporter. Each person's occupation was noted and the days and times at which the anchors regularly appear were also collected. Station employees sometimes have more than one of these job titles. Most commonly, a news anchor for one newscast may also be a general assignment reporter for others or a sports anchor might also be a sports reporter. In these cases, both titles were noted although the more senior position alone is coded so that occupation categories are mutually exclusive in the analysis.
In addition to position, data were also collected on other characteristics of the on-air staff. If available, information was collected on origin (state native or not), first year at the station, first year of paid employment in television news, total number of stations an employee has worked for, approximate age range (20-29, 30-39, etc.) , and highest degree obtained. Data were also collected on the sex, race, hair color, and ethnicity of each employee. Measures of race and ethnicity are obviously subjective. In general, an employee was considered to be white and non-Hispanic unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. In the majority of cases it appears that minorities are members of the various large national associations for minority journalists such as the National Association of Black Journalists. Membership in such an organization, mention of the person's race or origin, or clear visual evidence were used to decide if a person was non-white. Four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive racial categories were created: white, black, Hispanic, and Asian. "Hispanic" is an ethnic identifier rather than a racial characteristic but, in the interest of simplicity and because nearly all of the Hispanic journalists in the sample would have also been categorized as "white," Hispanics were entered as a separate racial category. An "other" group was originally created to include employees who were not white, black, or Hispanic. However, 123 or the 125 employees in this category were Asian (the remaining two were Native American), so the category was renamed "Asian." Table 2 reports average characteristics of the on-air staff by race. Interestingly, minorities are more likely than whites to be a news anchor, a highly visible position. Also, fewer minorities, especially Hispanics and Asians, are male. Minorities also tend to be younger and more educated than their white counterparts. A final interesting pattern is that Hispanics and Asians tend to have less experience and tenure than whites and blacks, but to have worked at a similar number of stations, suggesting that they may change jobs more frequently.
Station Data
The 25 markets covered by the data have between 4 and 14 competing stations. The average market has 6 stations that broadcast local news in English and 1 station broadcasting local news in Spanish, and about a third of the cities have a 24-hour local news station. While controls are available for the number of competing broadcasts at a particular time slot, data on employee characteristics are only available for the four major network affiliates (NBC, CBS, ABC, and FOX), which precludes analysis of all competing stations in each market. The four major affiliates typically dominate local news markets, broadcast at similar times, and likely view each other as primary competitors.
5
Nielsen Media Research provided data on the number of people and households in each DMA as well as breaking this down by age, sex, and black and 5 Examining the 20 highest-rated news programs in each of the 25 markets, 478 of the 500 programs are broadcast by NBC, ABC, CBS, or FOX. Of the 22 high-rated programs not broadcast by NBC, ABC, CBS, or FOX, 10 are Spanish-language news programs broadcast by KMEX in Los Angeles and WLTV in Miami. The possible consequences of omitting Spanish-language stations are discussed in the following section. An additional 11 highrated programs are broadcast by independent news stations in Phoenix (KTVK) and San Francisco (KRON) and the remaining broadcast is CW affiliate WGN in Chicago. The results in Table 5 and Table 6 are qualitatively the same with Phoenix and San Francisco omitted from the sample.
Hispanic composition. In order to measure the Asian composition of the markets, data from the 2000 U.S. Census for each corresponding metropolitan area were used. In addition, local television listings were used to add information on the number of stations in each DMA that broadcast local news in English, the number of stations that broadcast local news in Spanish, and a dummy variable indicating that the DMA has a 24-hour local news station.
Of the 100 possible stations (4 per each of the 25 DMAs), 12 were dropped because they did not have local news programming or little or no biographical information was available, leaving 2, 569 biographical observations for 88 stations across 25 markets. The biographical information for each station was aggregated to calculate average characteristics of each station's on-air staff such as the percent who are black and the average tenure at the station. After matching anchors to time-slots, indicators of the characteristics of the anchor team that is specific to each broadcast were also included. However, because reporters do not tend to appear at regular times, they were not matched to specific broadcasts.
Information was also collected from each station's regional chapter of the Academy of Television, Arts, and Sciences, which have annual "Emmy Awards" for their respective regional stations. For 23 of the 25 DMAs, data from the 2003 local Emmy awards were used. For New York City and Detroit, which did not have 2003 Emmy information available, data from the 2004 Emmy awards were used. The awards process requires stations to submit news tapes for consideration for each category in which an award is granted and the station would like to be considered. The tapes are sent to another regional chapter (there are twenty in all) for review and winners are selected. There can be one, more than one, or no winner in a particular category. Because the number of categories differs by region, a variable measuring the percent of regional awards that a station won is used as a proxy for station quality.
The average station has about 29 on-air employees, with an average of 9 news anchors, 3 weather anchors, 2 sports anchors, and 15 reporters. Twentysix percent of the on-air employees in this sample are minorities. This is somewhat larger than the 21 percent reported by Papper (2003) in his summary of the RTDNA/Ball State University survey of news directors, but that could be explained by differences in samples. Specifically, the sample used here is only the 25 largest markets in the United States while Papper's results are based on more markets and on station manager reports of racial composition. It may simply be the case that stations in larger markets are more diverse than stations in smaller markets. While there are a large number of minorities appearing on-air at local news stations, the match between station composition and market demographics is closer for blacks and Asians than for Hispanics. Local stations have an average of 15 percent black employees while the average market is 12 percent black and an average of 5 percent Asian employees while the average market is 5 percent Asian. However, stations have an average of 6 percent Hispanic employees while the average market is 14 percent Hispanic. The difference could be an artifact of methodology: Hispanics may have been miscategorized more often than the other racial groups.
6
While minority representation is fairly high, it is frequently suggested that minority journalists are relegated to the lower-rated time slots.
7 For each show, indicators were constructed for the presence of at least one minority news anchor, a minority weather anchor, and a minority sports anchor. Table 3 summarizes the proportion of shows that have a minority anchor by time of day and part of week. The sample proportions suggest that morning news shows, which have lower ratings, on average, than evening news shows, are 10 percent more likely to have at least one minority anchor than are evening newscasts, but that weekend newscasts, which tend to have lower ratings than weekday newscasts, are 12 percent less likely than weekday casts to have a minority anchor. This trend is reversed for minority weather anchors. The results for news and weather anchors, therefore, do not offer consistent evidence that minorities are segregated to lower-rated slots. However morning and midday shows are 56 percent more likely and weekend shows are 14 percent less likely to have a minority sports anchor. This trend appears similar to that for news anchors, but, because many local sporting events take place on weekends and because additional sports coverage is usually scheduled then, it is possible that the weekend sportscasts are actually more popular than weekday sportscasts.
6 The basic assumption when identifying either group was that a person was white unless "proven" otherwise. Under this rule, to be classified as Hispanic, a person had to have more than a Spanish surname; he or she had to be a member of an organization of Hispanic journalists, mention heritage in their biography, or have some other piece of clear evidence. In the case of blacks and Asians, visual evidence could frequently also be used, making them less likely to be incorrectly identified as white.
7 For example, an article in the St. Petersburg Times reports that some minority journalists refer to weekends as the "weekend ghetto" (Deggans, 2003) . If this is the case, then it would appear that minority sports anchors tend to be segregated to lower-rated slots. The possibility that time slot selection is endogenous is addressed in the ratings regressions with the inclusion of joint time and market fixed effects.
Analysis of Employee Composition
If stations are engaging in competitive discrimination, a negative relationship is expected between the compositions of employees at competing stations. Table 4 reports the average differences between the largest and smallest station composition variables in a DMA. On average, in each DMA the major affiliate with the highest number of minorities has 4 more minorities on staff than the affiliate with the lowest. Similarly, the station with the highest minority composition (pct minority) has 12 percentage points more minorities than the station with the lowest minority composition.
8
To further explore the determinants of station composition, I estimate linear-in-means models of station racial, gender, and age composition as functions of the compositions of competing stations. Considering the equation for pctblack s,j , the black composition of station s in market j, the model takes the form
where X s is a vector of station s's characteristics and pctblack −s,j is the average black composition of competing stations in the market. If stations are 8 As indicated by the reported p-values, these differences are highly statistically significant. However, while it presents a simple way to illustrate the variation within markets, the actual sample sizes here are small enough that the law of large numbers on which the tests rely likely does not hold. As an alternative, I assumed that the probability of hiring a black (Hispanic) at each station was equal to the percent of blacks (Hispanics) in the market. For each market, I then calculated the probability of seeing both a station with the minimum observed composition and a station with the maximum observed composition. Averaging the results across markets, this probability was 5.5 percent for blacks and 6.7 percent for Hispanics.
differentiating via race as predicted by the model, γ < 0. This model is similar to models of social interactions in that identification of γ, the endogenous interaction between stations, may be complicated by exogenous interactions and correlated effects (Manski, 1993; Soetevent, 2006; Ionnides, 2008) . Using notation based on Soetevent (2006), let
where X −s,j is a vector of the mean characteristics of other stations in the market and Z j is a vector of characteristics of market j. It is assumed that E[ s |X −s,j , Z j ] = 0. The coefficient η measured exogenous interactions in which non-racial characteristics of competing stations affect the black composition of station j. While I do not rule out the possibility that η = 0, exogenous effects seem unlikely in this context because it is not obvious what noncompositional characteristics of competing firms would be related to station s's choice of composition. To the extent that exogenous effects are present, it is assumed that non-compositional characteristics of competing stations would tend to influence stations in a similar manner. The coefficient δ measures correlated effects in which the composition of station j varies with market characteristics common to all stations. Correlated effects are likely positive because common market characteristics influence the composition of all competing stations similarly. Measures of market demographics are included in the estimated regressions to attempt to control for correlated effects, but unobservable characteristics may remain. The presence of unobserved exogenous interactions and/or correlated effects biases estimates of the endogenous interaction, γ. It is frequently the case that a researcher expects γ > 0, but also anticipates positive exogenous interactions and correlated effects (η ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0).
9 This leads to uncertainty about whether estimates of positive social effects reflect endogenous peer effects or are the result of some other unobserved commonality between peers that causes them to behave similarly. The key in the model presented here is that the endogenous peer effect, γ, is expected to be negative rather than the more typical positive, while exogenous and correlated effects continued to be presumed positive. Therefore, if the estimated effect is negative in the presence of positive bias, it holds that the true interaction effect is negative. If, on the other hand, the estimated effect is positive, the true effect is indeterminate. In other words, to the extent that positive exogenous and correlated effects create upward bias, a negative estimate of the endogenous social effect is all the more strongly pointing to differentiation. This approach of bounding the estimate is similar to literature on land development in which congestion creates negative endogenous interactions (Irwin and Bockstael, 2002; Ionnides, 2008) .
Another concern raised in the social interactions literature is that of the "feedback loop" (see, e.g., Soetevent (2006) ). This describes a social multiplier effect in endogenous interactions in which individual i influences individual j who in turn influences individual i and so on. The economist usually only observes the aggregate effect rather than being able to identify the single direct endogenous interaction. Here, too, there may be a feedback loop in which stations influence each other simultaneously. This may magnify a negative relationship, but it remains the case that a negative estimate of the endogenous social interaction is only possible is the true effect is negative. Table 5 reports the results of five random effects regressions for station composition where the right-hand-side variables include own-station characteristics, market characteristics, and competing-station characteristics. Considering the own-station variables, there is not strong evidence of discrimination by employers. An indicator that a station has a minority station manager and/or news director, minority manager, was included in order to see if the race of managers has any relationship with the race of employees. For instance, white managers may discriminate against black employees while black managers may not. However, the coefficient is positive and significant only in the sex regression, indicating that minority managers are positively correlated with female employees. An indicator that a station has a female manager was also included, but the coefficient is not significant in any of the regressions.
10
It is possible that station managers and news directors do not bear all of the burden of hiring decisions. But in this case, one would expect that there would be a positive correlation between the characteristics of managers and on-air staff because both are employees subject to the same employer discrimination. That there is not strong evidence of this only further supports the conclusion that employer discrimination does not play a role in this market.
11
10 Because it was especially difficult to collect information on the characteristics of station managers, the race of the station manager or news director is only known for 49 of the 88 stations. Hence, the coefficient on minority manager is actually comparing the impact of a minority manager relative to a white manager or to a manager of unknown race. This could be the source of the lack of significance in the remaining 3 regressions. However, the results are similar if a dummy indicating that manager race was not observed is included. Because manager names were more readily available than biographies and pictures, the sex of managers was identified at 79 of the 88 stations.
11 Another way to look for employer discrimination is to control for the corporate owner of a station. There are 23 corporate owners (such as News Corp., Gannett, Disney, etc.) in this sample. However, coefficients on owner indicators were neither individually nor jointly significant, suggesting that a common owner is not correlated with similar hiring decisions. Similar evidence of a lack of owner influence is found in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) , who find that common corporate ownership if not correlated with newspaper "slant." Market-level random effects estimates of station percent black, percent Hispanic, percent Asian, percent female, and mean age. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Controls for market characteristics that may tend to generate correlated effects are included. The coefficients suggest there is significant positive relationship between the racial composition of a market and the composition of all stations within it. A 1 percentage point increase in the percent of a market's population that is black is correlated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the percent black at a station. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in the percent of a market's population that is Hispanic is correlated with a 0.7 percentage point increase in the percent Hispanic at a station. There do not, however, appear to be cross-racial effects for markets and stations; the percent black in a market is not significantly related to the percent Hispanic at a station and vice versa. Looking at females, there is a large effect of the gender composition of a city on the composition of a station, an especially surprising result given the low variance in dma pct female, which only ranges from 50 to 53 percent in this sample. With the exception of age, therefore, it seems that the characteristics of television journalists are related to the corresponding characteristics of the market. This finding likely represents the effects of labor supply, station response to audience demand, and the impact of EEO laws as enforced by the FCC.
Turning to endogenous interactions, as suggested by the theoretical model, there is a significant negative relationship between the racial compositions of stations within a market. A 1 percentage point increase in the average percent black at other stations in a market is correlated with a 0.5 percentage point decrease in a station's own percent black. And a 1 percentage point increase in the average percent Hispanic at other stations is correlated with a decrease of 1.1 percentage points in own percent Hispanic. Similar trends hold for sex and age. A 1 percentage point increase in the average percent female at competing stations is correlated with a 0.9 percentage point decrease in percent female. And a one year increase in the average age of employees at competing stations is correlated with an own average age decrease of four months. While there is not strong evidence of this sorting for Asian employees, this is also the only one of the categories in which the market composition is proxied with Census data on the metropolitan area because Nielsen Media Research did not provide information on Asian market composition.
The negative relationship between the compositions of competing stations is unlikely to be the result of a small pool of potential employees. Journalists appear to move easily and frequently between markets; the hiring of a minority by one station does not substantially lower the availability of minorities to other stations. In this sample, the average journalist has worked at 4 stations and at the average station only a quarter of employees are natives of that state. This indicates that even if a particular market does not have many minorities, that does not mean that there are no minorities available to hire. Furthermore, with its reputation as a tough field to crack, there appears to be no shortage of potential journalists of any race.
The estimates of the negative relationship between the composition of competing stations are likely to be positively biased due to omitted measures of common market characteristics that induce stations to behave similarly. Indeed, in an (unreported) model that does not include any measures of market characteristics, the estimates of endogenous interactions are positive in four of the five cases. However, to the extent that unobserved exogenous interactions and/or correlated effects positively bias the results in Table 5 , the negative estimates all the more strongly indicate that the true effect is, as predicted, negative.
Customer Preferences
The station data were combined with the Nielsen ratings to create 740 newscast observations. One observation might be the weekday 6 p.m. news on the NBC affiliate in Atlanta, Georgia, and another might be the weekend 11 p.m. news on another affiliate in the Seattle-Tacoma area. Ratings regressions measure customer response to station composition.
12 Regressions are of the form
where rating ijt is the rating of show i in market j at time-slot t, S ij is a vector of containing the characteristics of the station and its employees, and N ijt is a vector containing the characteristics of that particular newscast. It is plausible and, indeed, Hausman specification tests indicate that there are certain unobserved effects captured by c jt that are particular to a time slot in a given market and are correlated with the regressors. For instance, if minorities are indeed assigned to slots that are expected to receive low ratings, then the estimated effect of racial composition may be downward biased. In an attempt to account for this possibility, the specification incorporates joint market and time fixed effects. In other words, the estimates are based on differences in outcomes for newscasts in the same market at the same time of day. Table 6 reports the results for the above model using a matching specification to measure station composition. The racial and gender composition n 740
Nielsen ratings of local newscasts as a function of employee, newscast, and station characteristics using joint market and time-slot fixed effects. Matching variables measure match between station composition and market composition, where a match of 100 indicates that the station is perfectly representative of the market and a match over 100 indicates that station employees are over-representative of that group in the market. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 of a station is measured relative to the same characteristics of the market.
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These weighted variables can be thought of as matching measures; the variables black match, hispanic match, asian match and f emale match are the ratios of station composition to market composition multiplied by 100. So, if black match is equal to 100, the station exactly matches the black composition of the market while if black match is less than 100 the station under-represents blacks and if black match is greater than 100 the station over-represents blacks. Using the matching specification allows for the possibility that the effect of adding blacks is different in markets with different racial compositions. In addition to these variables measuring the overall composition of journalists at a station, there are also indicators for the sex and minority status of the news, weather, and sports anchors on the particular newscast being observed.
14 Turning to the results, only 2 of the 6 variables measuring a broadcast's anchors' characteristics are statistically significant. These estimates indicate that if a male news anchor is replaced with a female one, ratings decline by 0.61 percentage points and if a white weather anchor is replaced with a minority one, ratings decline by 0.51 percentage points.
The variables measuring overall station composition suggest that customers have preferences for aggregate employee characteristics at a station as measured by hair color, race and ethnicity, gender, and age composition. The coefficient on pct blond suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the percent of employees who are blond yields ratings that are 0.1 percentage points higher.
15 Because specification tests indicate that cubic functions are appropriate for the remaining composition variables, the matching variables for average station characteristics were entered along with their squares and cubes. Figure 1 shows the estimated rating as a function of each of the five composition variables.
16
The shapes of the first three estimated functions for black match, age, and f emale match indicate that ratings initially decline with increasing representation of the group in question, but the negative effect diminishes or even 13 Age is not weighted because Nielsen Media Research did not provide detailed age characteristics for markets.
14 More detailed indicators for anchor team composition were also considered so that,for instance, a solo white male anchor could be compared to a black male/white female duo and so on. However, these more detailed indicators were jointly insignificant.
15 Interacting hair color with sex did not indicate that there was a significant difference in how customers respond to blond women relative to blond men. However, the sample of blond men was much smaller than that of blond women.
16 The domain of these functions is limited to the 5 th to 95 th percentile of observed composition. As indicated in Table 6 , the estimated coefficients for the cubic specifications are statistically significant with the exception of the coefficient for hispanic match 3 . If a spline function is used to estimate the average slope of the functions about the inflection points, the changes in slopes discussed in the following text are all significant with a p-value < 0.10. reverses at higher levels of representation. This finding cannot be explained by previous models of discrimination. Becker's model of customer discrimination predicts that diminishing marginal utility would cause the negative impact to increase with minority representation. A model allowing for taste for diversity would suggest that the functions would be concave.
Considering the results for blacks, for example, ratings initially decline as black representation at a station increases, but, as station composition begins to exceed market composition, ratings develop a positive relationship with black composition. This suggests that customers of stations with few black employees respond negatively to blacks, while customers of stations with many black employees respond positively. This result is consistent with a model of competitive discrimination in which stations with a relatively low composition of blacks are catering to consumers with a high discrimination coefficient, while those stations with more blacks are catering to consumers who are without such strong prejudice against blacks or even have preferences for them. However, if the black composition variable becomes high enough, ratings will begin to decline again, suggesting that at very high levels of representation (when there are more than 2 times as many blacks on the station than in the market, which happens in fewer than 10 percent of observed cases) even the less prejudiced consumers begin to exhibit a negative response.
Similar results hold for age and gender. The initial negative effect of age diminishes as average age increases, although it does not exhibit a strong positive trend as seen for black match. For gender composition, the negative effect of adding women also diminishes at higher compositions. This again is consistent with a model in which stations adjust their gender and age composition to cater to different groups of customers; in these cases in appears that some customers are prejudiced against women and older employees while the remaining customers exhibit little preference over these dimensions.
Looking at Hispanics, ratings increase over low levels of composition but decline with the addition of more Hispanic employees when hispanic match exceeds 60. Similarly for Asians, ratings increase with Asian representation among employees until that representation exceeds Asian composition in the market. The concavity of these two functions is not consistent with the model of differentiation, but instead could suggest a taste for diversity in which consumers prefer to see about half as many Hispanics and about the same number of Asians on television as are in the market. However, as mentioned earlier, Hispanics may have been categorized incorrectly more often than other groups. If, for instance, Hispanics employees in markets with fewer Hispanics were less likely to acknowledge or point out their ethnicity than were employees in more Hispanic markets, this could bias the estimates. Finally, stations that broadcast in Spanish or other languages are not included in this sample. It could simply be the case that these stations cater to customers with the greatest taste for seeing Hispanic or Asian minority groups.
In addition to measures of the characteristics of the on-air staff, indicators for a female and minority manager were also included in the ratings regressions as a sort of check on the results. Assuming that managers are much less visible to customers than the on-air journalists, their race or sex should not have an effect on ratings. However, the estimates suggest a positive and significant effect for female managers and a negative and significant effect for minority managers. If these managers were visible, the results could indicate some preference of customers. An alternative explanation might be that the race or gender of managers is correlated with the content of local news programming or of advertising previews or that these two groups are assigned to different types of stations. In either event, it is possible that the results for the on-air cast members could also be picking up some effect other than strict racial preferences.
Another source of potential bias arises from the lack of control for program-ming content. If it is the case that intra-market variation in programming is correlated with employee characteristics, the ratings estimates may be picking up the indirect relationship between race and programming rather than the direct effect of race.
Conclusion
The examination of the local news market has provided evidence of a previously unconsidered phenomenon in the discrimination literature: that discrimination may be used as a competitive device by firms. Local news stations appear to respond to the racial composition of their competitors and to try to differentiate themselves by race, age, and sex of their on-air employees. For three of the five groups examined, the ratings regressions indicate that the response of consumers varies with the racial composition of the firms in a manner consistent with the idea of product differentiation and the "capture" of certain segments of consumers. Viewers of the more "white" stations have a stronger negative reaction to an increase in blacks than do viewers of the "black" stations, suggesting that stations with few blacks cater to consumers with a high discrimination coefficient against blacks, while stations with more blacks cater to customers who are less prejudiced or who prefer blacks. Similarly, viewers of stations with more females and older employees have a smaller negative response to these groups than viewers of stations with lower concentrations. While the results for Hispanics and Asians suggest a customer preference for diversity rather than differentiation or strict racial preferences as originally modeled in the literature, it seems likely that the exclusion of foreign language local news has biased these results.
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